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Informed Trading by Foreign Institutional Investors as a 
Constraint on Tunneling: Evidence from China 
 
ABSTRACT  
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
 
Research Question/Issue: This paper investigates how the trading activities of foreign institutional investors 
(FIIs) affect the tunneling activities of controlling shareholders in an emerging economy (China). 
 
Research Findings/Insights: We use an unbalanced panel dataset of 167 FIIs with investments in Chinese real 
estate firms during the period 2003 to 2011, which gives us 1006 firm-year observations in total. We find strong 
support for our hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between FII trading turnover and the extent of 
tunneling by controlling shareholders.  
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: In many emerging economies, the institutional environments for investor 
protection are weak. Powerful controlling shareholders may take the opportunity to extract private benefits via 
tunneling activities to the detriment of minority shareholders, and informed minority investors may also take 
advantage of less well-informed investors. There are thus multiple principal-principal agency conflicts.  FIIs are 
a particularly important group of informed investors. On the one hand, large-scale aggressive trading by FIIs 
should drive stock prices to fundamentals, provide market discipline to management, and thus limit tunneling. On 
the other hand, FIIs may opt to exploit their private knowledge to gain trading profits at the expense of uninformed 
investors, and implicitly support tunneling. We highlight these potential effects, and demonstrate empirically an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between FII trading turnover and the extent of tunneling. 
 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Tunneling is a serious issue, particularly in emerging economies where the 
institutional arrangements for minority investor protection are often weak. FII involvement may enhance market 
discipline, but may also exacerbate the problem so policy-makers need to guard against potential adverse effects. 
An ownership cap on FII shareholdings is unlikely to be effective, but policy-makers might strengthen QFII 
license revocation policies and issue more licenses to promote competition among FIIs. 
 
Keywords 
Corporate Governance, tunneling; emerging economy; foreign institutional investors; informed trading; principal-
principal conflicts 
 
  
  
Informed Trading by Foreign Institutional Investors as a 
Constraint on Tunneling: Evidence from China 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Tunneling refers to the extraction of value from a firm by its controlling shareholders 
(Johnson et al, 2000). It involves the controlling shareholders using their dominant position to 
extract private benefits of control at the expense of the minority shareholders, and thus 
constitutes a principal-principal agency problem. Tunneling is facilitated by opaque and 
complex information environments, such as exist in many emerging economies, in which large 
and/or inside shareholders are often much better informed about the firm’s performance and 
prospects than smaller minority investors (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Makhija & Patton, 2004). 
These information asymmetries provide fertile grounds for tunneling activities. 
 Some minority investors, however, are better informed than others. In particular, 
(domestic and foreign) institutional investors and proxy advisors1 typically have sophisticated 
information collection and processing skills, which provide them with an advantage over less-
informed investors (Kim & Yi, 2015; 2009; Campbell & Kracaw, 1980) and which mean that 
their trading activities may be characterised as “informed”. This raises the possibility of 
potential agency conflicts not just between controlling and minority shareholders, but also 
between informed and uninformed minority investors. 
 Now there is a sizeable literature highlighting the influence of institutional investors, 
and especially hedge funds inter alia on the performance, dividend payouts, board structure, 
and executive remuneration in their target firms (e.g. Song & Szewczyk, 2003; Hartzell & 
Starks, 2003; Brav et al, 2008), on M&A performance (e.g. Gaspar et al, 2005), on capital 
redeployment and/or investment restrictions (e.g. Brav et al, 2015; Bebchuk et al, 2015), and 
on the rivals of their target firms (e.g. Aslan & Kumar, 2016). Furthermore, there is also 
  
literature detailing the potential roles and impacts of proxy advisors (Ertimur et al, 2013; 
Malenko & Shen, 2016). Nevertheless, there are still gaps in our understanding of the motives 
and influence of institutional investors. Certainly institutional investors face a well-
documented compromise between exerting control through equity ownership and maintaining 
liquidity (Coffee, 1991; Black, 1992), with empirical evidence suggesting a preference for 
liquidity (Gillan & Starks, 2007; McCahery et al, 2016). But they also face a less-researched 
compromise between using their trading activities to leverage their “informed” status and exert 
discipline on the management of their target firms, or alternatively to extract trading rents for 
private gain.  
Recent years have witnessed significantly increased capital flows by foreign 
institutional investors (FIIs) to emerging economies (Frenkel & Menkhoff, 2004; Liu et al, 
2014). In this paper, we build upon the literature on institutional investor activism and focus 
on the trading activities of these FIIs. Research has shown that the behavior of FIIs in emerging 
economies may differ from the behavior of FIIs in developed economies, and may also differ 
from the behavior of domestic institutional investors in emerging economies (Liu et al, 2014). 
FIIs are typically independent from the management of their target firms with the only links 
provided by their portfolio investments (Huang & Zhu, 2015; Kang et al, 2016; Bae et al, 2012; 
Massa et al, 2015; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Edmans et al, 2013; Edmans & Manso, 2011) and, 
in comparison to domestic counterparts in emerging economies, are more experienced and 
sophisticated (Ng & Wu, 2007), less subject to political pressures (Kim & Yi, 2015), and better 
informed (Kim & Yi, 2015) and thus more capable of incorporating firm-specific information 
into their trading activities. FIIs typically only take small shareholdings in their target firms in 
emerging economies (Fang et al, 2015; Liu, et al, 2014; Hattari & Rajan, 2011; Ferreira & 
Matos, 2008, Ferreira et al, 2011; Tesar & Werner, 1995). This is largely because the FIIs are 
making portfolio investments and wish to maintain liquidity and/or because of host countries’ 
  
regulations on concentrated ownership (Hattari & Rajan, 2011). As their shareholdings are 
small, the FIIs’ direct influence on tunneling activities is unlikely to be significant.  
But the FIIs potentially exert a much greater indirect influence on corporate governance 
through their trading activities (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans & Manso, 
2011; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Gallagher et al, 2013; Zhang et al, 2015). On the one hand, 
large-scale aggressive trading by FIIs will promote competition among informed investors, 
which should drive stock prices to fundamentals, dependent on corporate managerial actions, 
and thus provide market discipline to management and controlling shareholders – and thus limit 
tunneling. On the other hand, many critics have questioned whether FII activism benefits 
shareholders or whether they destroy value through their preference for liquidity and the “hot 
money” nature of much of their trading (Froot et al, 2001; Hattari & Rajan, 2011). FIIs may 
thus engage in discreet small-scale trading activities when they perceive significant profit 
opportunities. Such trading behavior not only facilitates controlling shareholders’ tunneling by 
adding noise to the market and adversely affecting price efficiency (Bushman et al, 2004; 
Ferreira et al., 2011; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980), but also encourages managerial opportunistic 
behavior as the feedback reaction to such inefficient stock markets (Chen et al, 2007; Edmans 
et al, 2012; Edmans et al, 2015; Hart, 1983). We would thus expect to see increasing levels of 
tunneling at low levels of FII trading turnover, but reduced levels of tunneling as FII trading 
turnover becomes more large-scale. 
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, we add to the very 
limited literature exploring the motives and influence of institutional investors, and particularly 
FIIs, in emerging economies. Second, we hypothesize that institutional investors are not only 
faced with the well-known trade-off between control through ownership and liquidity (Coffee, 
1991; Black, 1992), but also with a less-researched trade-off between using their trading 
activities to leverage their “informed” status to extract trading rents for private gain, or 
  
alternatively to exert discipline on the management of their target firms. Furthermore, we 
suggest that these conflicting motives are particularly strong for FIIs operating in emerging 
economies where the institutional arrangements for investor protection are weak. We thus 
conclude that potential conflicts of interest between informed and uninformed minority 
investors constitutes an additional principal-principal agency problem in many emerging 
economies in addition to that between the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders. Third, we demonstrate empirically that FII trading activities have an impact upon 
the tunnelling activities of controlling shareholders. Moreover, we recognize that tunneling 
may be effected in various ways, which may usefully be categorized as cash-flow tunneling, 
asset tunneling, and equity tunneling (Atanasov et al, 2014). We demonstrate that these 
different types of tunneling activities may happen independently, but that FII trading has 
similar effects in each case.” 
The paper is structured as follows. We first discuss how market forces may mitigate 
agency conflicts, before highlighting the conflicting pressures upon well-informed FIIs to 
extract trading rents for private gain or to use trading activities to exert discipline on the 
management of their target firms. Drawing on these theoretical insights, we develop an 
hypothesis relating FII trading to the extent of tunneling by controlling shareholders. We then 
explain the operationalization of the dependent and explanatory variables, present and discuss 
some descriptive statistics, and outline the estimation methodology for the main regression 
analysis and the robustness tests. The empirical results are then presented and discussed, and 
we conclude with some comments about the importance and applicability of our analysis and 
make some suggestions about future work. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In many emerging economies, the institutional environments for investor protection are 
  
weak (La Porta et al, 1998; Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Kumar & Zattoni, 2015). Share markets are 
typically more volatile and less efficient (Beny, 2007; Morck et al, 2000) as a result of serious 
information asymmetries, weaker property-right regimes, and more insider trading. Share 
ownership is often concentrated, and large shareholders have the power and incentive to 
mitigate the classic principal-agent conflicts (Claessens & Fan, 2002). As their shareholdings 
are small, the FIIs’ direct influence on tunneling activities is unlikely to be significant. 
However, powerful shareholders in weak institutional environments may also have strong 
incentives to extract private benefits via tunneling activities at the costs of uninformed minority 
investors, stimulating principal-principal conflicts (Berkman et al, 2009; Dyck & Zingales 
2004). For example, wealth may be transferred by large state-controlled firms to rescue other 
state-controlled firms in financial distress situations to the detriment of minority investors (Gao 
& Kling, 2008; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Jiang & Wang, 2010; Lo et al, 2010), or by family-
controlled firms to maximize family benefits at the costs of non-family investors (Zhang et al, 
2013; Zhang et al, 2015). In short, minority shareholders may suffer from the presence of large 
controlling shareholders (Coff, 1999). 
But even the controlling shareholders (and their nominated managers) of listed 
companies are not completely immune to market forces. The aggregating mechanism of an 
efficient stock market - by incorporating all available public or private information to reveal 
the fundamental investment value for all shareholders - can represent an effective market 
discipline over opportunistic managers (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980). Central to this market 
discipline are informed trades which drive stock prices to fundamentals, dependent on 
corporate managerial actions. With the stock price more sensitive to these actions, governance 
through trading credibly rewards (penalizes) the stock-incentivized manager, who ex ante has 
greater incentive to put in effort by means of costly hidden actions (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; 
Garvey & Swan, 2002). Ultimately stock-incentivized managers exert more effort on behalf of 
  
shareholders, thereby improving performance (Gallagher et al, 2013; Edmans et al, 2013, 2015; 
Zhang et al, 2015; Massa et al, 2015). Thus trading by well-informed investors can potentially 
provide an alternative governance mechanism to minimise both principal-agent and principal-
principal conflicts (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans 2009, Edmans & Manso 2011; Edmans 
et al, 2013; Ferreira et al, 2008, 2011; Gallagher et al, 2013; Zhang et al, 2015; Massa et al, 
2015).  
FIIs are an influential group of informed investors in emerging economies, as noted 
above. Previous research has considered the direct effects of FII equity ownership on firm 
performance and other outcomes (Chen et al, 2006; He et al, 2013; Luo et al, 2014), but the 
empirical evidence has been far from conclusive2 perhaps because FII equity ownership is 
typically small as it constrained by local regulations. But the FIIs potentially exert a much 
greater indirect influence on the governance of their target firms through their trading activities 
although, as with all informed investors, they are faced with conflicting pressures (Kyle, 1985; 
Carlton et al, 1998; Charkavarty & Sarkar, 2002; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Song & Stewczyk, 
2003; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Denes et al, 2016).  
On the one hand, they can use their private knowledge to gain trading profits at the 
expense of uninformed investors (Anderson et al, 2012; Beny, 2007; Cohn & Rajan, 2013; 
Edmans & Manso, 2011; Gorton et al, 2016; Massoud et al, 2011; Zhang et al, 2015). In order 
to generate trading profits, FIIs may trade discreetly, breaking their trades into small volumes, 
spreading their trading orders over time, and delaying orders or even abstaining on occasions 
(Back & Baruck, 2004; Easley & O’Hara, 1992; Dufour & Engle, 2000). FIIs which trade in 
this informed but discreet manner are exploiting their informed positions and maximizing their 
trading profits, but at the expense of uninformed minority investors. Furthermore, their discreet 
trading not only stimulates conflicts between informed and uninformed minority investors, but 
also compromises the effective external discipline of the market by adding noise to the market 
  
to adversely affect price efficiency in discovering tunneling activities (Gorton et al, 2016; 
Bushman et al, 2004; Ferreira et al, 2011; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). The “invisible” hand of 
an efficient market to discipline management becomes ineffective (Hart, 1983; Massa et al, 
2015; Gorton et al, 2016) and, moreover, tunneling activities can be stimulated as firms often 
shape their behaviour reacting to inefficient stock markets (Chen et al, 2007; Edmans et al, 
2012, 2015; Hart, 1983). In short, the interests of FIIs engaged in discreet trading coincide with 
those of the controlling shareholders: the latter will extract their tunneling rents and the former 
their trading rents, both at the expense of the uninformed minority shareholders. As such 
discreet trading, by definition, involves relatively small-scale and infrequent trades, we would 
thus expect to see tunneling activities increasing with the levels of FII trading turnover at low 
levels of trading. 
On the other hand, however, FIIs may engage in more aggressive trading, taking 
advantage of their superior knowledge and independence. Gantchev & Jotikasthira (2016) 
demonstrate that institutional sales raise the probability of a target firm becoming a target for 
activist hedge funds, hence FIIs have an incentive to trade loudly in order to signal a 
problematic target and protect their own investment and ultimately enhance market efficiency. 
Such aggressive trading improves price informativeness (Easley & O’Hara, 1987), and quickly 
reduces the information advantages that informed investors may have over uninformed 
investors. Furthermore, such aggressive trading disciplines management, strengthens market 
efficiency (Garvey & Swan, 2002; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; Ting et al, 2008; Gallagher et 
al, 2013; Zhang et al., 2015), and should increase investors’ returns through improved long-
term firm performance. Such aggressive trading typically involves larger and more frequent 
transactions (DeJong et al, 1996; Holthausen et al, 1990; Keim & Madhavan, 1996), leading to 
higher levels of reported trading turnover. As market discipline is increased, the tunneling 
activities of the controlling shareholders will be circumscribed, the interests of the FIIs will be 
  
more aligned with those of the uninformed minority investors, and the multiple levels of 
principal-principal conflicts will be mitigated. We would thus expect to see tunneling activities 
decreasing as levels of FII trading turnover increase at high levels of trading. We thus 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between FII trading 
turnover and the extent of tunneling by the controlling shareholders. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 We focus our empirical analysis on listed real estate companies in China for three main 
reasons. First, China is of course not only an emerging economy, whose institutional 
environment is characterized by many of the weaknesses discussed above, but a very large and 
dynamic economy and thus an attractive proposition for FIIs in search of high returns. In 2002, 
China introduced its Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme under which 
approved FIIs were permitted to invest in listed Chinese companies. The scheme was based on 
similar programmes launched in Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam (Gillan & Starks, 2003; Yeo, 
2003), and was one of the first efforts to internationalize the Renminbi (RMB). Once licensed, 
FIIs are permitted to buy limited numbers of RMB-denominated “A shares" in China's 
mainland Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Second, all FIIs are expected (CSRC, 2005: 
Article 1) ‘…to improve the corporate governance standard.’ However, there are significant 
concerns that China’s booming real estate market attracts numerous investors, including FIIs, 
with speculative incentives. The more dynamic value changes in land and/or property assets, 
concentrated ownership structures, and weaker investor protection in China compared with 
advanced economies such as the US and UK can lead to more serious agency problems 
associated with information asymmetries between management and investors (Bauer et al, 
2010; Devos et al, 2013). It is not clear yet to what extent such a high level of private 
  
information asymmetries in real estate companies can be scrutinized by investors and market 
intermediaries such as FIIs. The focus on the Chinese real estate sector thus provides a good 
setting to investigate the offsetting effects of FIIs speculative trading and beneficial governance 
on tunneling activities. Third, the complex nature and high information asymmetries in real 
estate firms often lead to monitoring failures (Ebrahim & Mathur, 2007; Litan, 1992), despite 
real estate firms being subject to strict regulations and special monitoring by banks3. 
 
The Dataset  
The sampling period is from 2003 to 2011, the period right after 2002 when China 
introduced the QFII scheme. We identified all FIIs which had invested in the Chinese real estate 
firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. All of the FIIs in our sample held 
less than 5% of the overall shares issued by their target firms, thus their shareholdings are small 
and they not classified as block-holders using the minimum levels used in the previous 
literature (Gallagher et al, 2013; Zhang et al, 2015; Edmans et al, 2013; Ferreira et al, 2008, 
2011). Furthermore, all the FIIs were independent investors, whose business links with their 
target firms were limited to the portfolio investments. Financial data were collated from the 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research database (CSMAR) and the OSIRIS database. 
After removing observations with missing data, we get an unbalanced panel dataset with 167 
FIIs with investments in 45 or (34%) out of 133 Chinese real estate listed firms during 2003 to 
2011, which gives us 1006 firm-year observations in total.  
We measure the trading turnover of the FIIs by calculating an annualized churn rate 
(see below for details) using the quarterly churn rate calculated based on their quarterly 
portfolio data from Bloomberg. Previous research (e.g. Aggarwal et al, 2011) focused on 
changes in FIIs’ shareholdings using annual data, but such an approach does not take account 
of the considerable buying and selling that take place within years. The use of quarterly data 
  
partly mitigates this problem though, clearly, using data with even higher frequencies would 
be better. 
 
The Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in the empirical analyses is the amount of funds that have been tunneled 
in a given year (TUN). Tunneling may be effected in a number of ways, which may be usefully 
categorized as cash-flow tunneling, asset tunneling, and equity tunneling (Atanasov et al, 
2014). Cash-flow tunneling refers to the diversion of ongoing cash flows; asset tunneling 
involves the sale of assets by the firm to the controlling shareholders at below-market prices, 
or from the controlling shareholders to the firm at above-market prices; and equity tunneling 
relates to the extraction of value via financial transactions that affect ownership claims rather 
than the firm’s operations. 
We consider two proxy measures for tunneling. The first measure focuses on cash-flow 
tunneling, as there is some evidence that this is the most frequent form of tunneling (Cheung 
et al, 2006; Jian & Wong, 2010; Jiang et al 2010). However, cash-flow tunneling is more 
complex and less visible than the various asset and equity mechanisms (Baek et al, 2006; Bates 
et al, 2006), and hard evidence of cash-flow tunneling beyond anecdotal testimony remains 
scarce (Bertrand et al, 2002). Some recent papers (Cheung et al, 2006; Jian & Wong, 2010; 
Jiang et al, 2010) have reported that cash-flow tunneling activities are often associated with 
related party transactions (RPTs). RPTs are especially prevalent in China, where the majority 
of listed companies have emerged from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and often continue to 
share capital, assets and personal functions with their parent companies (Liu & Lu, 2007). 
Following previous research (Cheung et al, 2006; Jiang et al, 2010; Jian & Wong, 2010; Liu & 
Lu, 2007), we measure RPTs using the accounting item “other receivables” in the firms’ 
balance sheets4. The “other receivables” item may also include some legitimate transactions, 
  
but Li (2010) reports that such legitimate transactions represent only an insignificant portion 
of the total (for example, 9.48% on average from 2002 to 2007). Furthermore, we expect these 
legitimate transactions to be a small proportion of “other receivables” across the sample 
irrespective of the types of firms and the extent of FII investment.  Therefore, we use the 
amount of funds tunneled via related party transactions as our measure of cash flow-tunneling 
(TUN-CF). 
But some controlling shareholders may supplement or substitute cash-flow tunneling 
with asset tunneling and/or equity tunneling. Leuz et al (2003) argue that controlling 
shareholders and managers, in trying to protect their private control benefits, “manage” 
reported earnings so as not to reveal actual firm performance to outsiders. Our second proxy 
measure of “general” tunneling (TUN-GE) is, following Liu & Lu (2007), based on the 
abnormal accruals (AAC) 5 estimated from the modified Jones (1991) model:   
 tftftftftftftftf TAPPETAvTATAAccruals ,,,3,,2,1,, //Re//     (1) 
where TAf,t is total assets in year t for firm f, tfv ,Re is the change in sales revenues in year t 
for firm f, and PPEf,t is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm f.  We denote the 
residual estimated from the above model as abnormal accruals (AAC). 
Cash-flow tunneling (as measured by TUN-CF) may be used by controlling 
shareholders in concert with asset tunneling and/or equity tunneling, but may also be used 
independently. Indeed, as the descriptive statistics below will show, there is almost no 
correlation between the two measures of tunneling in our sample of firms. This suggests that 
TUN-CF may only capture a small portion of general tunneling activities, hence the need to 
consider both proxy measures as dependent variables. 
 
The Explanatory Variables 
 We have hypothesized that the amount of tunneling is related to the trading turnover 
  
undertaken by the FIIs (TRAD). Following Gaspar et al (2005) and Attig et al (2013), we 
operationalize TRAD by measuring, on average, how frequently all FIIs rotate their investment 
in a given invested Chinese real estate company f in a given year t. This average churn rate is 
influenced by each single FII i, its own churn rate in each Chinese real estate company f in year 
t (CRi,f,t). We calculate CRi,f,t based on a given individual FII i’s available quarterly churn rates 
(QCRi,f,k,t) in a given year t, which captures its inter-year trading activities and how it rotates 
its investment in the firm f in year t. More specifically, the denominator of this churn rate 
QCRi,f,k,t is the average share value held by a given FII i at quarter k of year t (measured by 
𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘,𝑡+𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡
2
, where Pf,k,t and Ni,f,k,t represent the price paid by and the number of 
shares of company f  held by the given FII i at quarter k of year t). The numerator of this churn 
rate is the absolute share value change invested in the firm f which is caused by trading 
activities of the given FII i during that quarter k of year t. Such absolute value change reflects 
FII’s buy as well as sell trading activities. We calculate such absolute value change due to FII’s 
trading activities using the share value change invested the firm f by the given FII i during that 
quarter k of year t minus the share value change due to the pure price movement rather than 
this given FII i’s trading activities during that quarter k of year t ( |𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡∆𝑃𝑓,𝑘,𝑡|).  
Therefore: 
TRADf,t=
1
𝐼
∑ CR𝑖,𝑓,𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 =
1
𝐼
∑ (𝐼𝑖=1
1
𝐾
∑
|𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘,𝑡−𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡−𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡∆𝑃𝑓,𝑘,𝑡|
𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘,𝑡+𝑁𝑖,𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡𝑃𝑓,𝑘−1,𝑡
2
)𝐾𝑘=1    (2) 
where I is the number of FIIs invested in firm f in year t, and  K is the number of quarters that 
FII i invested in firm f in year t. 
 Our regression model also includes a range of control variables suggested by the 
literature (Gao & Kling, 2008; Jiang et al, 2010; Peng et al, 2011). First, we control for any 
potential direct influence of FIIs through ownership by including the aggregate shareholding 
  
of FIIs in the sampled real estate firms (OWN). We further control for firm size (SIZE), growth 
opportunities (GROW), firm leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF), liquidity (LIQ), and a 
dummy variable (STAT) for whether the controlling shareholder is the State.  
We expect FIIs with larger shareholdings to play more a positive governance role 
(Ferreira & Matos, 2008) in their target real estate firms, and thus predict a negative 
relationship between FII shareholdings (OWN) and all types of tunneling. Larger firms are 
more likely to design and maintain sophisticated and effective internal control systems, and 
thus circumscribe the ability of controlling shareholders to manipulate reported earnings to 
cover their tunneling activities (Xie et al, 2003). We would thus expect a negative relationship 
between firm size (SIZE) and TUN-GE. However, large firms are also likely to have more 
complicated bureaucratic structures, which facilitate related party transactions with affiliated 
firms in their business groups (Chen et al, 2006; Lo et al, 2010). We would thus expect a 
positive relationship between firm size and TUN-CF. All forms of tunneling are more costly in 
firms with higher growth rates (Peng et al, 2011; Shen & Chih, 2007), so we expect the 
coefficients of GROW to be negative in both regression analyses. Leverage (LEV) is expected 
to have a positive relationship to all forms of tunneling (Gao & Kling, 2008; Jiang et al, 2010; 
Peng et al, 2011), as higher levels of debt provide higher levels of funds that may be potentially 
expropriated and stronger incentives for controlling shareholders to engage in activities to 
cover their tunneling and avoid debt covenant violations (Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Low 
levels of profitability (PROF) are associated with poor governance and thus with high levels 
of tunneling (Jiang et al, 2010). We assume that FII churn rates depend upon the FIIs’ 
objectives, and reflect their (discreet or aggressive) trading activities. But the churn rates may 
also be constrained by the FIIs’ available liquidity. We measure available liquidity (LIQ) by 
the  total number of shares traded during a year divided by the firm’s overall outstanding shares, 
and expect that greater liquidity should be associated with better price discovery (Edmans et 
  
al, 2013) and less tunneling. Tunneling is also more likely in State-controlled firms (STAT), 
as it is well-documented that such firms transfer assets frequently to rescue other State-owned 
firms which are in financial difficulties (Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012; Gao & Kling, 2008; Jiang 
et al, 2010; Lo et al, 2010). 
In addition, the locations of real estate markets are important (Jones Lang LaSalle, 
2009; 2010) so we include a time-invariant dummy (TIER1) equal to one if the real estate firm 
is located in a Tier 1 city (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou & Shenzhen), and zero otherwise. 
The real estate markets in the Tier 1 cities (TIER1) are more visible and attractive to investors 
than those in Tier 2 and 3 cities (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2010; Merton, 1987), and thus they are 
subjected to more scrutiny by sophisticated investors, which mitigates tunneling. Finally year 
dummies are included to control for policy changes that impact FIIs’ investment decisions. 
Detailed definitions of the explanatory variables, and of their expected impacts, are provided 
in Table 1. 
------------------------------- 
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The regression model to be estimated is thus: 
𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑓,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑓,𝑡 + 
𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝑓,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1𝑓,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑓,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑓,𝑡  (3) 
where f  refers to firm f and t refers to year t. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. Forty five percent of the real 
estate firms are located in Tier 1 cities, and 49% are State-controlled. There are 167 non-zero 
values in the sample of 1006 firm-year observations, suggesting that FIIs carefully choose 
  
selected Chinese real estate firms, rather than passively diversify their portfolios across all 
companies. The mean amount of cash-flow tunneling (TUN-CF) over the sample period is 
RMB204.87m, similar to the level reported in Li (2010), though there is considerable variation 
between the real estate firms. The mean abnormal accrual rate (TUN-GE) is -2.99 %, with a 
large variation of 10.96%. This is similar to the level reported in Liu & Lu (2007). The mean 
annual churn rate (TRAD) across the full sample is 1.35%, but rises to 9.35% for the non-zero 
observations. The mean share ownership held by the FIIs is only 0.04% across the whole 
sample, though this figure rises to 0.32% for the non-zero observations. Clearly, however, the 
FIIs can have little direct influence on the activities of their target companies. 
------------------------------- 
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Table 2 also provides the correlation matrix for all variables. The correlation between 
the two measures of tunneling (TUN-CF and TUN-GE) is small and negative (r = -0.05) 
suggesting that controlling shareholders’ dispositions to engage in, on the one hand, cash-flow 
tunneling and, on the other hand, equity and/or asset tunneling may be unrelated. All the 
explanatory variables (with the exception of PROF) manifest similarly-signed and similarly-
sized correlation coefficients with both dependent variables. The correlation matrix shows that 
none of the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables exceed 0.70, suggesting 
that multicollinearity will not be a severe problem according to accepted “rules of thumb” 
(Farrar & Glauber, 1967). Indeed, only one correlation (firm size with trading turnover) is 
greater than 0.4, and most are less than 0.1. We also conducted VIF tests, again without 
detecting multicollinearity problems. 
 
Methodology 
  
Two sets of results are generated for each measure of tunneling using (1) fixed-effects 
or random-effects regression, depending on the results of the Hausman test (Baltagi, 2008), 
and (2) dynamic GMM panel regression. To address reverse causality concerns and possible 
endogeneity, we also estimated the model using the two-stage instrumental variable GMM 
approach (Aslan & Kumar, 2012)6.  
Following Haans, Pieters and He (2016), we used the Sasabuchi test (Sasabuchi, 1980) 
and all three steps of Lind & Mehlum (2010) to test the validity of the U-shaped relationship 
between trading turnover and tunneling. As Lind & Mehlum (2010) point out, a spurious U-
shaped relationship may be detected when the true relationship is convex but monotone over 
relevant data values thus a quadratic specification may then erroneously yield an extreme point. 
The Sasabuchi test checks whether or not a significant squared term is indeed the result of an 
actual quadratic relationship. According to Sasabuchi (1980), given equation (3), the 
requirement for an inverted U-shape is that the slope of the curve is positive at the start and 
negative at the end of a reasonably chosen interval of TRAD-values [TRAD_l,TRAD_h], where 
TRAD_l is the lower bound of TRAD value, and TRAD_h is the higher bound of TRAD value. 
The natural choice of interval is in many contexts the observed data range [min(TRAD), 
max(TRAD)]. Thus we need to test  
(1) the slope at the lower bound of TRAD value (TRAD_l), which can be calculated as 
(β1 + 2β2TRAD_l), is significantly larger than 0  
(2) the slope at the higher bound of the TRAD value (TRAD_h), which can be 
calculated as (β1 + 2β2TRAD_h), is significantly smaller than 0. 
 (3) the co-existence of both (1) and (2) satisfies the Sasabuchi (1980) test.  
The turning point needs to be located well within the data range to account for finite sample 
bias and to correct for biases caused by departure from normality (Haans, Pieters & He, 2016; 
Fieller, 1954). Taking the first derivative of Equation (3) and setting it to zero yields the turning 
  
point at -β1/2β2. Following Haans, Pieters & He, (2016) and Fieller (1954), we also check 
whether the Fieller confidence interval [
^^
, hl  ] for such turning point is inside the data range. 
If the confidence interval is within the data range, one can be reasonably sure that there exists 
a U-shaped curve.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The regression results are summarized in Tables 3 (cash-flow tunneling) and 4 (general 
tunneling). The Hausman test supported the use of fixed effects regression, and these results 
are shown as the first three models in Table 37. Model (1) only includes the control variables 
(apart from the time-invariant TIER1 dummy). The adjusted coefficient of determination is 
0.25. Cash flow tunneling is higher in larger firms since larger firms are normally part of 
business groups, which are more likely to conduct cash-flow tunneling (Chen et al, 2006; Lo 
et al, 2010). Also, firms with higher leverage exhibit more cash-flow tunneling by controlling 
shareholders, consistent with the findings from Gao & Kling (2008), Jiang et al, (2010) and 
Peng et al (2011). In contrast, firms with high growth opportunities and profitability experience 
less cash-flow tunneling, results that are consistent with those reported by Peng et al (2011) 
and Jiang et al (2010). Presumably controlling shareholders are content to take their due 
rewards in profitable growing firms, but resort more to cash-flow tunneling in poorly-
performing firms. FII’s ownership is found to have a positive influence to cash flow tunneling, 
which indicates that direct FII share ownership does not constrain the tunneling activities of 
largest shareholder in China.  
------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 3 about here 
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Model (2) includes FII trading turnover (TRAD) in addition to the control variables. It 
  
shows that FII trading turnover is significantly and positively related to cash-flow tunneling, 
suggesting that FII trading may be dominated by speculative motives to extract trading rent. 
However, in Model (3), we also add in the trading turnover variable in its quadratic form. The 
value of the adjusted coefficient of determination rises to 0.28, and the signs and statistical 
significance of all the control variables are broadly unaffected. The coefficient of the linear 
TRAD term is positive (β1 = 18.10, p < 0.001) and highly significant, whilst the coefficient of 
the squared term (TRAD2) is negative (β2 = -0.22, p < 0.001) and also highly significant. The 
hypothesised inverted U-shaped relationship between FII trading turnover and the extent of 
cash-flow tunneling is confirmed the Sasabuchi test (test statistic = 3.14, p < 0.001) as (1) the 
slope of the curve is significantly positive (18.10, p < 0.001) at the lower end of the interval, 
(2) significantly negative (-20.43, p < 0.001) at the higher end of the interval, and (3) the co-
existence of both (1) and (2). The curve reaches its estimated maximum point when trading 
turnover is 40.50 %, within the data range – see Figure 1. A 90% confidence interval using the 
Fieller (1954) method is evaluated as [32.10, 48.82], again within the data range. Hypothesis 1 
is thus strongly supported by the results of the fixed effects regressions. 
------------------------------- 
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In order to correct for possible endogeneity, we next estimate the model using two 
variants of the GMM method: the two-stage instrumental variable GMM approach (Aslan & 
Kumar, 2012) and the instrumental variable approach of Arellano & Bond (1991). In Model 
(4), we report the results of the Aslan & Kumar two stage instrument GMM regression (GMM-
AK): we use LIQ and TIER1 as instrumental variables for the FII trading activities (TRAD) 
and its squared term (TRAD2). Liquidity is mostly supplied by uninformed investors, especially 
in China (Anderson et al, 2012; Zhang et al, 2015). This liquidity directly facilitates FIIs’ 
  
informed trading (Edmans et al, 2013; Edmans, 2009), which in turn affects cash-flow 
tunneling. This makes LIQ an ideal instrument as it meets both the exclusion restriction (i.e. 
there is no reason that general liquidity should be related to tunneling activities through any 
other channel than facilitating informed trading) and the inclusion restriction(i.e. liquidity 
facilitates informed trading). Similarly, Tier 1 cities (TIER1) may only affect tunneling through 
an enhanced visibility to sophisticated informed investors (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2010; Merton, 
1987). The choice of these two instrumental variables is thus theoretically sound, and also 
empirically justified: both are significantly related to FII trading8, but were insignificantly 
related to cash-flow tunneling (TUN-CF) and general tunneling (TUN-GE) in our unreported 
regression analyses. In Model (5), we report the results of the Arellano & Bond GMM 
regression (GMM-AB): we use the lagged values of the TRAD and TRAD2 as instrumental 
variables. This procedure eliminates the persistent components of the latent or unobservable 
variables and the error terms, and helps to address the reverse causality issue. In both models, 
the estimated coefficients of TRAD are positive and statistically significant, whilst the 
estimated coefficients of TRAD2 are negative and statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 is thus 
supported. FIIs undertaking small amounts of discreet trading do so to gain trading profits at 
the expense of the uninformed investors, and tolerate cash-flow tunneling by the controlling 
shareholders. FIIs undertaking larger amounts of more aggressive trading promote price 
informativeness, and curtail any cash-flow tunneling tendencies by the controlling shareholders. 
Table 4 presents the results of modelling the determinants of general tunneling (TUN-
GE). The Hausman test suggested that the appropriate methodology was random effects 
regression, and these results are shown as the first three models in Table 4. Model (6) only 
includes the control variables. The adjusted coefficient of determination is 0.33. General 
tunneling is lower in larger firms since larger firms are more likely to maintain effective 
internal control systems, and thus reduce the ability of controlling shareholders to manipulate 
  
reported earnings to cover especially asset and/or equity tunneling activities (Xie et al, 2003). 
Firms with higher leverage exhibit significantly more tunneling by controlling shareholders, 
whilst firms with high profitability experience less tunneling as the controlling shareholders 
are presumably content to take their due rewards in profitable firms but resort more to tunneling 
in poorly-performing firms. And FII share ownership is found to have a significant positive 
influence to general tunneling, suggesting that FIIs may well be more interested in capitalizing 
on their superior knowledge. 
------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 4 about here 
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Model (7) further includes FII’s trading turnover (TRAD) in addition to the control variables. 
It shows that FII trading turnover is significantly and positively related to general tunneling, 
suggesting that FII trading may be dominated by speculative motives to extract trading rent. In 
Model (8), we also add in the trading turnover variable in its quadratic form. The value of the 
adjusted coefficient of determination rises to 0.36, and the signs and statistical significance of 
all the control variables are broadly unaffected. The coefficient of the linear TRAD term is 
positive (β1 = 0.15, p < 0.001) and highly significant, whilst the coefficient of the squared term 
(TRAD2) is negative (β2 = -0.002, p < 0.001) and also highly significant. The hypothesized 
inverted U-shaped relationship between FII trading turnover and the extent of tunneling is 
confirmed as we find that (1) the slope of the curve is significantly positive (0.15, p<0.001) at 
the lower end of the interval, (2) significantly negative (-0.19, p<0.001) at the higher end of 
the interval, and (3) the co-existence of both (1) and (2) is supported by the Sasabuchi test (test 
statistic = 3.25, p < 0.001). Again Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. As Figure 2 shows, the 
curve reaches its estimated maximum point when trading turnover is 38.22 %, within the data 
range.  
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The remaining models show the estimated results using the two variants of the GMM 
method. In Model (9), we report the results of the GMM-AK regression using LIQ and TIER1 
as instrumental variables for the FIIs’ trading activities (TRAD) and its squared term (TRAD2) 
respectively. In Model (10), we report the results of the GMM-AB regression using the lagged 
values as instrumental variables. Once again both regressions show significant positive 
coefficients for TRAD, and significant negative coefficients for TRAD2. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported: there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between FII trading activities and the 
extent of general tunneling.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Substantial amounts of wealth may be tunneled by controlling shareholders, especially 
in many emerging economies where corporate governance is characterized by substantial 
information asymmetries and weak protection of minority investors. Previous research has 
focused on how FIIs, as a particularly important group of informed investors, exert influence 
directly on corporate governance through their shareholdings. In this paper, we hypothesize 
that FIIs may also exert an indirect influence through their trading activities and that this 
mechanism raises the possibility of principal-principal conflicts at multiple levels. We suggest 
that FIIs may engage small-scale in discreet trading activities to take advantage of their 
informational advantages and extract trading rents and, in so doing, that they facilitate 
tunneling by the controlling shareholders. In these circumstances, the interests of the FIIs and 
the controlling shareholders coincide at the expense of the uninformed minority shareholders. 
But if FIIs engage in large amounts of aggressive trading, then this will impose market 
  
discipline and constrain the tunneling activities of the controlling shareholders.  
Our research has important implications for policy-makers and those charged with the 
administration of QFII regulations in emerging economies. First, the authorities need to 
recognize that FIIs may influence the governance of their target firms not just through their 
shareholdings but also through their share trading activities. Thus a simple cap on FII 
shareholdings will only partially constrain FII influence on corporate governance. Second, FIIs 
may bring capital and promote better corporate governance, but they also have an incentive to 
take advantage of their informed positions to extract trading rents. Increased tunneling by 
controlling shareholders may result. The authorities need to guard against these potential 
adverse effects by strengthening QFII license revocation policies so as to prevent FIIs abusing 
their trading positions. Furthermore, more licenses might be issued to qualified FIIs, so that 
competition among the FIIs can mitigate any rent-extracting trading opportunities and promote 
price informativeness. Third, the real estate sector in China is heavily regulated and monitored, 
yet these efforts are largely ineffective. There is a need to promote market discipline to 
complement the existing regulations and monitoring activities. 
 Our research may be extended in several ways. First, our empirical analysis has focused 
on the real estate sector in China. The sector was chosen because, notwithstanding strict 
regulations and delegated bank monitoring, tunneling activities persist because of the complex 
nature of the sector and the substantial information asymmetries therein (Ebrahim & Mathur, 
2007; Litan, 1992). Further research might focus on other financial and/or non-financial sectors 
within China, in order to ascertain whether FII informed trading has similar effects in sectors 
with fewer regulations and/or less bank monitoring. Second, the analysis could also be 
replicated in the context of other emerging (and advanced) economies to establish whether or 
not our findings are more generally applicable. As various authors (e.g. Chen et al, 2007; Aslan 
& Kumar, 2014) have pointed out, the impacts of different types of institutional investors are 
  
likely to vary across different institutional environments. Third, both proxy measures for 
tunneling are far from perfect, and more research would be welcome to elicit better measures 
of each of the three types of tunneling. This would, in turn, allow a better empirical appraisal 
of the impact of FII trading on each type of tunneling. Furthermore, the analysis could extended 
to other forms of trading (e.g. short selling). 
1 Also short sellers (Massa et al, 2015) and blockholders (Edmans & Manso, 2011; Edmans et al, 2013), though  
foreign institutional investors remain small and their short-selling is restricted in many emerging economies 
(Huang & Zhu, 2015; Fang et al, 2015; Liu, et al., 2014; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Hattari & Rajan, 2011; Ferreira 
et al, 2011; Tesar & Werner, 1995).  
2 For example, Aggarwal at al (2011) and Ferreira & Matos (2008) both reported that FII investments had positive 
effects on firm performance, whilst Sun & Tong (2003) find insignificant effects. Foreign ownership is associated 
with higher corporate transparency and lower information asymmetries (see, for example, Kang & Stulz, 1997; 
Jiang & Kim, 2004; Kang & Stulz, 1997; Gul, Kim & Qiu, 2010; Bae, Ozoguz, Tan, & Wirjanto, 2012; Kang, 
Kwon, & Park, 2016; Kim & Yi, 2015, 2009). In contrast, various authors (e.g. Choe et al, 1999; Froot et al, 2001; 
Gabriele et al., 2000) have suggested that the negative short-term market reaction may reflect concerns that FIIs 
may have speculative and destabilizing effects when they invest in emerging economies. 
3 It is under debate whether specific governance rules should be considered for the real estate sector (Fan et al, 
2013; Devos et al, 2013; Bauer et al, 2010; Eichholtz & Kok, 2008; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003, 2005). 
4 ‘Other receivables’ is defined by China’s Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as receivables 
coming from transactions other than sales and purchase of goods and services, such as securities deposit at other 
organizations, payments made by corporations on behalf of their employees, and compensation receivables. 
5 Most of the studies using US data define accruals as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
and operating cash flows. Chinese data, using the Chinese GAAPs, do not report separately so-called “one-time” 
items such as extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Instead, we use net income rather than earnings 
before extraordinary items, following Liu & Lu (2007). 
6 Two other sets of results were also generated but are not reported here due to space constraints, but are available 
from the authors. Fixed-effects models do not permit the inclusion of time-invariant variables, with the result that 
endogeneity issues due to omitted time-invariant factors affecting both dependent and independent variables are 
unaddressed. A set of Hausman-Taylor (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) regressions was thus estimated in which the 
endogenous time-invariant variable was instrumented using time-varying control variables. The Hausman-Taylor 
model is more efficient than either the fixed- or the random- effects models in reducing the endogeneity issues 
due to such omitted variables. One important characteristic of our sample is that there are many observations 
where the trading turnover is zero, due to the FIIs’ highly selective investments in the Chinese real estate sector. 
This generates potentially serious self-selection bias, which we address in a further set of regressions by estimating 
random-effects regressions using propensity score matching samples (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) to retest our 
                                                          
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
hypothesis. We match firms with FIIs to firms without FIIs, based on propensity scores estimated from their firm 
size, leverage, growth, profitability, state control, liquidity and the tier 1 dummy. This propensity score model 
uses nearest neighbors one-to-one matching. The order of observations is randomly ranked to avoid the matching 
bias caused by the order of observations. 
7 We obtained robust results when we used random effects regression. 
8 The p values are smaller than 0.01, and the first-stage F values are larger than 10 - indicating that LIQ and TIER1 
are strong instrumental variables. 
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TABLE 1: Definitions of the Variables 
 
Variable Definition Expected 
impacts 
on cash-flow 
tunneling 
Expected 
impacts 
on general 
tunneling 
TUN-
CF 
Cash-flow tunneling = the value of “other receivables” in the balance 
sheet at the end of the year  
  
TUN-
GE 
General tunneling = the value of the abnormal accruals ratio (see text 
for details) 
  
TRAD Annualised churn rate (see text for details) + + 
TRAD2 Squared value of TRAD - - 
OWN Combined shareholdings of FIIs at the end of the year as a % of total 
shares (%) 
- - 
SIZE ln (total assets at the end of the year). Assets are measured in RMB 
million 
+ - 
GROW Percentage growth in assets from the start to the end of the year (%) - - 
LEV ln (Ratio of total debts to total assets at the end of the year) + + 
PROF The Return on Assets (ROA) in the previous year - - 
STAT Dummy variable = 1 if the largest shareholder is a State-controlled 
company; = 0 otherwise 
+ + 
LIQ Liquidity of the firm measured by ln (the year-end trading volume of 
stock over the total share outstanding ) 
+ + 
TIER1 Dummy variable = 1 if the firm is located in a Tier 1 city (i.e. Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen); = 0 otherwise 
- - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1.Cash Flow 
Tunneling  
1.00           
2.General 
Tunneling  
-0.05† 1.00          
3.FII Trading  0.34*** 0.33*** 1.00         
4. FII Ownership 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 1.00        
5. Firm Size 0.66*** 0.41***  0.42*** 0.37*** 1.00       
6. Growth 
Opportunity 
-0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.00      
7. Leverage 0.02* 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.24*** 1.00     
8.Profitability -0.04 0.01 0.06* 0.03 0.07* 0.05 † -0.12*** 1.00    
9.State Controller 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.06* 0.06* 0.14*** -0.02 -0.06* -0.03 1.00   
10.Liquidity -0.02 -0.01 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.1*** 0.03 -0.12*** 0.15*** -0.09*** 1.00  
11.Tier 1 Cities 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.16*** -0.02 0.01 0.07* 0.17*** 0.02 1.00 
MEAN 204.87 -2.99 1.35 0.04 7.70 20.00  0.51 1.90 0.49 1.18 0.45 
SD 403.70 10.96 6.39 0.23 1.47 131.16  0.36 5.94 -- 0.74 -- 
Notes: (1) Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
(2) Number of observations = 1006 
(3) Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level is indicated by †, *, ** and *** respectively
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TABLE 3: The Determinants of Cash-flow Tunneling (TUN-CF) 
 
Variables Fixed Effects Regressions 
GMM Regressions 
GMM-AK GMM-AB 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
FII Trading (β1) -- 6.03† 18.10** 37.52* 15.50* 
  [1.94] [3.13] [2.93] [2.02] 
FII Trading2 (β2) -- -- -0.22*** -0.50* -0.19* 
   [-3.34] [-1.97] [-2.01] 
FII Ownership (β3) 224.26* 194.98† 162.36† -65.86 103.69 
 [2.13] [1.93] [1.69] [-1.13] [1.45] 
Firm Size (β4) 145.36*** 137.43*** 131.04*** 89.82*** 49.67† 
 [5.41] [5.37] [5.23] [3.89] [1.94] 
Grow Opportunity (β5) -0.11† -0.11† -0.11† -0.31** -0.25* 
 [-1.82] [-1.89] [-1.88] [3.10] [2.24] 
Leverage (β6) 164.7*** 151.25*** 140.31*** 162.33*** -37.97 
 [4.03] [3.76] [3.5] [5.86] [-0.68] 
Profitability (β7) -5.71** -5.52** -5.36** -8.41*** -0.68 
 [-2.92] [-2.87] [-2.87] [-3.62] [-0.29] 
State Controller (β8) 34.14 34.98 37.7 -7.03 16.27 
 [0.51] [0.52] [0.57] [-0.37] [0.37] 
Liquidity (β9) 23.71 17.33 22.95 -- -- 
 [0.99] [0.71] [0.8] -- -- 
Numbers of observations/firms 1006/133 1006/133 1006/133 1006/133 1006/133 
F-Value 4.19*** 4.18*** 4.29*** 135.35*** 24.28*** 
R2 0.25 0.28 0.30 -- -- 
Hausman statistics 25.27 *** 39.65 *** 37.40*** -- -- 
Slope at TRAD low level (β1+2β2TRADl)        -- -- 18.70*** 38.88** 16.02* 
Slope at TRAD high level (β1+2β2TRADh)        -- -- -20.43*** -49.48** -17.62* 
Sasabuchi test statistic -- -- 3.14*** 1.76* 1.91* 
90 confidence Fieller interval (TRADl, TRADh)   -- -- [32.1, 48.82] [20.83,66.69] [28.36,57.95] 
Extreme point /Within the data range -- -- 40.5/Yes 37.52/Yes 40.36/Yes 
Notes: (1) Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.  
(2) Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level is indicated by †, *, **, ***, respectively.  
(3) The heterosedasticity bias is corrected by using the Huber-White process. 
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TABLE 4: The Determinants of General Tunneling (TUN-GE) 
Variables Random Effects Regressions 
GMM Regressions 
GMM-AK GMM-AB 
 Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
FII Trading (β1) -- 0.05* 0.15*** 1.30* 0.16* 
  [2.13] [3.24] [2.18] [2.01] 
FII Trading2 (β2) -- -- -0.002*** -0.02* -0.002* 
   [-3.48] [-2.34] [-1.98] 
FII Ownership (β3) 1.17** 0.93** 0.63** -14.76† 0.04 
 [2.95] [3.00] [2.85] [-1.79] [0.07] 
Firm Size (β4) -2.43*** -2.49*** -2.54*** -4.61** -0.80 
 [-3.85] [-3.87] [-3.92] [-2.96] [-0.52] 
Grow Opportunity (β5) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01** 
 [0.59] [0.58] [0.59] [0.72] [-2.71] 
Leverage (β6) 7.59** 7.51** 7.45** 7.55 2.08 
 [2.89] [2.88] [2.84] [1.77] [0.53] 
Profitability (β7) -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -1.06** 
 [-2.15] [-2.14] [-2.14] [-2.01] [-2.99] 
State Controller (β8) 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.27 -0.34 
 [0.77] [0.77] [0.78] [0.73] [-0.34] 
Liquidity (β9) -0.84 -0.89 -0.97 -- -- 
 [-1.64] [-1.61] [-1.60]   
Tier 1 Cities (β10) 0.89 0.87 0.83 -- -- 
 [1.41] [1.38] [1.33]   
Numbers of observations/firms 975/133 975/133 975/133 975/133 975/133 
F-Value 208.61*** 207.86*** 208.77*** 265.67*** 137.66*** 
R2 0.33 0.34 0.36 -- -- 
Hausman statistics 6.29 6.95 8.60 -- -- 
Slope at TRAD low level (β1+2β2TRADl)        -- -- 0.15*** 1.30* 0.16* 
Slope at TRAD high level (β1+2β2TRADh)        -- -- -0.19*** -2.18* -0.19* 
Sasabuchi test statistic -- -- 3.25*** 1.73* 1.66* 
90 confidence Fieller interval (TRADl, TRADh)   -- -- [32.67, 42.74] [17.57, 49.25] [35.06, 85.69] 
Extreme point /Within the data range -- -- 38.22/Yes 32.50/Yes 42.54/Yes 
 
Notes: (1) Variable definitions are provided in Table 1.  
(2) Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level is indicated by †, *, **, ***, respectively.  
(3) The heterosedasticity bias is corrected by using the Huber-White process. 
  
39 
 
FIGURE 1: The Relationship between FII Trading Turnover and Cash-flow Tunneling 
by Controlling Shareholders (TUN-CF) 
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FIGURE 2: The Relationship between FII Trading Turnover and General Tunneling by 
Controlling Shareholders (TUN-GE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
